Lead me not into temptation: drug price regulation and dispensing physicians in Switzerland by Rischatsch, Maurus
ORIGINAL PAPER
Lead me not into temptation: drug price regulation
and dispensing physicians in Switzerland
Maurus Rischatsch
Received: 13 June 2012 / Accepted: 26 June 2013 / Published online: 18 July 2013
 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
Abstract While most countries separate drug prescrip-
tion and dispensation to ensure independent drug choice,
some allow this combination to increase pharmaceutical
access in rural areas or to increase the utilization of phar-
macist skills. A drawback of this approach is that dis-
pensing physicians or prescribing pharmacists may be
incentivized to increase their own profits through the pre-
scription of cost-inefficient drug packages, leading to an
increase in pharmaceutical spending. Switzerland consti-
tutes an interesting example of where dispensing and non-
dispensing physicians coexist, permitting a comparison of
their prescribing behavior. The present study shows that
drug margin optimization is possible under the current drug
price regulation scheme in Switzerland. Using drug claims
data, empirical findings indicate a 5–10 % higher margin
per dose for dispensing physicians compared to pharma-
cists. Cost per dose is 3–5 % higher when dispensed by
physicians instead of pharmacists.
Keywords Physician dispensing  Prescribing behavior 
Pharmaceutical pricing  Physician agency
JEL Classification I10  I11  C11  C54
Introduction
By law, in order to prevent financial incentives affecting
the way prescriptions are issued, many countries separate
drug prescription and drug dispensation. Critics accuse
combined providers—dispensing physicians or prescribing
pharmacists—of being influenced by personal profit con-
siderations when choosing a drug brand and/or drug
quantity. South Korea constitutes one example of where
physician dispensing and pharmacy prescribing was
allowed until 2000, but was separated thereafter to tackle
inefficient drug allocation and consumption, as discussed
by Soonman [14].
The advantage of combining drug prescription and dis-
pensation is that it permits increased pharmaceutical access
in rural areas or allows greater use of pharmacists’ skills, as
discussed by Tonna et al. [15]. The former is the reason
why physician dispensing is allowed in some Swiss juris-
dictions, while the latter explains why pharmacy pre-
scribing was introduced in the United Kingdom, where
patients face long waiting periods to see a doctor (see
Pearson et al. [12]). According to Emmerton et al. [5],
pharmacist prescribing was successfully introduced for
similar reasons in the United States, Canada, and New
Zealand. More recently, the introduction of advanced-
practice pharmacies in California to tackle a physician
shortage has been strongly debated. Whatever the reason
for combining prescription and dispensation, policy makers
should keep in mind the potential disadvantages of com-
bining these two activities.
Such potential disadvantages of combining drug pre-
scription and dispensation emerge for different reasons.
Providers serve as agents for their patients, making diag-
noses and prescribing the most adequate drugs and drug
quantities. If they act as perfect agents, they make the same
decisions as their patients would given all relevant infor-
mation (see Zweifel et al. [17], Chap. 8). However, the
relationship between drug providers and their patients (or
insurers where health insurance covers drug expenditure) is
characterized by a strong information asymmetry.
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Economic incentives may seduce them to deviate from
their role as perfect agents, leading to a misallocation of
resources. Therefore, it is important to investigate if dis-
pensing physicians and prescribing pharmacists show a
different prescribing behavior to their colleagues who do
not have the right to dispense or prescribe, respectively.
Further, it is necessary to explore if the incentive due to the
pharmaceutical pricing mechanism is strong enough to lead
them into temptation to optimize their own drug margins.
In most countries, health care markets are heavily reg-
ulated, and public authorities administrate pharmaceutical
prices. In some countries like Switzerland, drug prices are
regulated at the manufacturer level, and so-called logistic
margins are added to cover the cost of drug distribution.
Logistic margins are often composed of two components: a
per-package contribution and a price-dependent contribu-
tion proportional to the manufacturer price. In Switzerland
especially, the per-package component is under consider-
able strain because it permits dispensing physicians to
increase their own profit by prescribing the same drug
quantity in smaller packages.
The objective of the work described in this article was to
investigate whether combining drug prescription and dis-
pensation leads to margin optimization activities under a
pharmaceutical pricing mechanism that includes a per-
package component. The article is structured as follows.
The ‘‘Institutional background’’ section describes the
health care system and pharmaceutical pricing scheme
employed in Switzerland. The ‘‘Theoretical drug margin
optimization’’ section examines theoretical margin opti-
mization by dispensing physicians. The ‘‘Modelling
approach’’ section introduces the econometric modeling
approach and outlines how drug margin optimization is
measured empirically. The ‘‘Data’’ section reports the used
drug claims data, and the ‘‘Estimation results’’ section
presents the results of the estimation, which elicit empirical
evidence for dispensing physicians’ margin optimization
activities. Finally, the ‘‘Conclusions and discussion’’ sec-
tion concludes the paper by discussing the implications of
these results for improving drug price regulation in
Switzerland.
Institutional background
In Switzerland, health care is financed through lump sum
premiums that are independent of income. Purchasing
health insurance is mandatory for all citizens, while low-
income individuals are subsidized through premium
reductions. Every year, an individual can choose one of six
deductible levels ranging between CHF 300 and 2,500 (1
CHF & 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates) for the following
year. A higher deductible is rewarded with a lower
premium and is in general chosen by healthier individuals.
When the annual health care expenditure exceeds the
deductible, the insured individual must bear a co-payment
of 10 % up to a total payment of CHF 700. For expensive
brand-name drugs with at least one bioequivalent generic
competitor, the co-payment rate was increased from 10 to
20 % in January 2006, which was the case for all brand-
name drugs investigated in this study. But because the
market shares of the brand-name drugs dropped signifi-
cantly after the introduction of the higher co-payment rate,
the brand-name producers were forced to reduce their
prices, so the higher co-payment rates were abolished.
New pharmaceuticals have to be approved by Swiss-
medic, an independent epidemiological institute. After the
authorization, the Federal Office of Public Health (BAG)
decides—based upon the three criteria of effectiveness,
safety, and adequacy—if the drug should be placed on the
positive list of drugs that have to be reimbursed by health
insurers. The BAG is in charge of pharmaceutical pricing
through direct price regulation, as discussed by Bauer [2].
The manufacturer price (P) constitutes the maximum price
at which producers are allowed to sell their products to
dispensing physicians, pharmacists, and wholesalers. While
brand-name drugs are priced with the aid of an interna-
tional price reference system, generic drug prices are set in
comparison to the bioequivalent brand-name drug. In a first
step, the BAG negotiates with the drug producer about the
manufacturer price for the smallest package provided,
which is called the reference price (P*) in the following.
Once both parties have agreed on P*, the manufacturer
prices for larger package sizes and dosages are determined
following the manufacturer price relation defined by the
BAG. As shown in the left panel of Fig. 1, the BAG dis-
counts larger packages to make them cheaper for patients
in need of large quanties of drugs.1
A so-called logistic drug margin (M) based on P is paid
to pharmacies, dispensing physicians, and wholesalers to
cover the cost of drug distribution and storage. The logistic
drug margin is a combination of a fixed per-package
margin (mf) and a variable capital margin (mv) that is
calculated as a percentage of P so that M = mf ? mvP. The
per-package margin increases in increments that depend on
the manufacturer price category. The capital margin mv is
12–15 % for drugs cheaper than CHF 800 and 8–10 % for
prices between CHF 800 and 1,800. For prices above CHF
1,800, distribution costs are fully reimbursed through a per-
package margin of CHF 240. The logistic drug margin
function is shown in the right panel of Fig. 1, restricted to
the relevant domain for this study.2 The boxplots depicted
1 Compare Table 4 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
2 Compare Table 3 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
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in Fig. 1 show the distribution of observed manufacturer
prices in the analyzed drug claims data.
The final price paid by either patients or health insurers
is the sum of P and M, which is, for the sake of simplicity,
called the drug cost (C) in the following. In fact, only C is
observed in the drug claims data analyzed in this study.
The total (unofficial) drug margin may differ if dispensing
physicians or pharmacists are able to buy drugs below
P. Further, how the drug margin M is split between pro-
ducers, wholesalers, pharmacists, and dispensing physi-
cians is not regulated; it is determined by bargaining
between the market participants. Therefore, neither the
BAG, the insurers, nor the patients know exactly how
much profit the drug providers make from drug dispensing,
as discussed in Rischatsch et al. [13]. In addition, phar-
macists are allowed to charge payments directly to the
patient for checking the medication and assessing the
accuracy of the treatment, as well as to cover the cost of
recording the medication. It is strictly forbidden for dis-
pensing physicians to charge these fees, because they are
reimbursed for these services through the fee-for-service
system. If not explicitly prohibited by the physician,
pharmacists are allowed to substitute brand-name drugs
with generics, receiving a share of the insurer’s cost sav-
ings to promote generic substitution, as outlined in Dra-
binski et al. [4]. In general, the prescription form explicitly
mentions the drug brand in addition to the number of
packages, the package size, and the dosage per pill. The
fact that the drug name and the number of packages is
stated on the prescription form discourages pharmacists
from undertaking this substitution because the patient must
be convinced to accept the substitute. Readers interested in
a more detailed discussion of the Swiss pharmaceutical
market are referred to Hunkeler [6, 7] for a historical
review.
Theoretical drug margin optimization
In this section, before the empirical analysis is presented,
the theoretical optimization problem—i.e., determining the
choice of package size that maximizes logistic margin—is
discussed. This provides the foundation for further analy-
sis. All quantities are treated as continuous, even if they are
discrete in practice (e.g., reducing the package size by one
pill is impossible in practice).3 The section ends with an
illustrative example in which price data are used to dem-
onstrate the extent to which profit can be increased by
replacing larger packages with smaller ones (compare
Fig. 2 and Table 5 in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
The prescribing process starts with the diagnosis and
indication of the required chemical substance. Given that
the patent protection has expired and generic drugs are
available, the prescriber chooses a drug brand. Assuming
that the total dosage (Dt) and the dosage per pill (D) are
diagnosis specific and cannot be changed without conse-
quences for the patient’s health, Dt and D are given and are
not part of the choice process. Therefore, the prescriber
finally decides on the package size (S) and, implicitly, on
the number of packages (N). Acting as a perfect agent on
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Fig. 1 Relationships of the manufacturer price to package size of a particular drug (left) and to the logistic margin function (right) used in
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3 This is not the case in some countries, where drugs are sold by
patient-specific package sizes containing the exact number of pills
needed.
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behalf of the payer, the prescriber chooses the cheapest
combination of S and N. However, the financial interests of
dispensing physicians or prescribing pharmacists are in
conflict with cost-efficient drug provision. They can opti-
mize their own drug margin by solving the following
optimization problem:
max
N;S
MjDt; D ¼ N  mf þ mv  PðSjDÞ½ 
s:t: N  S  D ¼ Dt:
ð1Þ
Again, the quantity Dt denoting the total dosage to be
prescribed is assumed to be constant. Further, supplier-
induced demand is neglected in this study because this
work is focused on how dispensing physicians prescribe a
given quantity of drugs. This simplification is line with the
empirical analysis, because the estimation equation con-
trols for the prescribed drug quantity. Readers interested in
supplier-induced demand in health care are referred to
McGuire [10].
Modeling drug price regulation in Switzerland, the
manufacturer price (P) for a given dosage per pill (D) is
assumed to have the following functional form:
PðSjDÞ ¼ p1ðDÞ  S þ p2ðDÞ  S2; ð2Þ
where p1 and p2 represent the per pill contribution to the
package price (depending on D) with p1 [ 0 and p2 \ 0.
The latter incorporates the discounting of larger packages.
Both the per-package component (mf) and the capital
component (mv) of the logistic drug margin depend on the
manufacturer price. In this study, the share of analyzed
drug claims that have prices in the domain where a change
in price category is considerable (see Fig. 1) is negligible.
Therefore, mf and mv are assumed to be constant. Never-
theless, one should keep in mind that the increase in drug
margin achieved through the prescription of small pack-
ages could be offset by the application of a lower manu-
facturer price category and therefore price per package and
capital margin.
Combining Eqs. 1 and 2, and substituting the quantity
constraint directly into the resulting equation, the optimi-
zation problem then reads
max
S
MjDt; D ¼ Dt
DS
 mf þ mvðp1S þ p2S2Þ
 
: ð3Þ
Taking the first derivative of the drug margin with respect
to the package size and re-arranging the expression leads to
oM
oS
¼ Dt
DS
mf
S
þ mvp2S
 
¼ N mf
S
þ mvp2S
 
\0:
ð4Þ
Equation 4 shows that the logistic drug margin decreases
strictly monotonically with package size, leading to the
corner solution with the prescription of the smallest pack-
age available.4 Equation 4 unveils the role pharmaceutical
pricing plays in the optimization problem. The first term in
the parentheses of Eq. 4 shows that margin optimization is
stimulated through the per-package component, while the
second term reveals the role of large package discounting,
which provides an incentive to prescribe smaller packages
and increase the manufacturer price per pill, which in turn
translates into a higher logistic margin.
Conclusion 1 The design of the regulated logistic drug
margin in Switzerland permits dispensing physicians to
increase their own profits by reducing package size so that
a higher number of packages can be prescribed. Margin
optimization is possible because of the per-package com-
ponent of the logistic drug margin and the discounting of
large packages.
The second derivative shows that q2 M/qS2 = N(mf
S-2) [ 0. Thus, the dispensing physicians’ margin opti-
mization effort is more effective in the lower domain of S.
Conclusion 2 The less cost-efficient the package is, the
stronger the incentive to deviate and reduce the prescribed
package size.
Illustrative example
Estimating all necessary parameters from pricing data, the
relationship between the logistic drug margin and the
package size for a given total dosage can be plotted using
Eq. 3. Figure 2 visualizes how the logistic drug margin
changes with the package size used to prescribe 560 mg of
omeprazole (sold under the brand-name drug) in January
2006. The most frequently prescribed package during the
study period corresponds to the one with 28 pills and
20 mg per pill. Therefore, we assume a patient in need of
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Fig. 2 Drug margin as a function of package size for given Dt and
D values
4 The corner solution for the illustrative example given in the next
subsection is represented by the package containing seven pills (see
Fig. 2).
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20 mg per day for 28 days. In this case, the cheapest pre-
scription would be the one package described above. Then,
drug margin amounts to CHF 33 and the drug cost is CHF
126.5 On the other hand, two packages with 14 pills each
could be prescribed. This leads to a drug margin of CHF 50
(?52 %). Prescribing four packages with seven pills each
leads to a drug margin of CHF 85 (?158 %).
The example shows that the current price regulation
permits dispensing physicians to more than double their
profit for the same drug quantity by simply dispensing
them in smaller packages. Thus, Swiss drug price regula-
tions have great potential for conflicts of interest if drug
prescription and dispensation are combined. Additional
examples are given in Table 5 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
Modeling approach
This section outlines the strategy for estimating drug
margin optimization empirically. The ‘‘Drug margin and
cost measurement’’ subsection discusses the two dependent
variables that are used to estimate optimization activity and
its effect on pharmaceutical expenditure. The ‘‘Potential
margin and cost drivers’’ subsection discusses the explan-
atory variables included in the regression analysis, while
the ‘‘Model specification’’ subsection discusses the esti-
mated econometric model.
Drug margin and cost measurement
Logistic drug margin optimization by dispensing physi-
cians is investigated here by comparing the margin-per-
dose (MPD) values of dispensing physicians and pharma-
cies. Aggregating the MPD at the patient level instead of
comparing MPD values at the prescription level accounts
not only for margin optimization during individual physi-
cian visits but also over time. If the drug brand used by a
patient changes over time, observations are treated sepa-
rately. On the one hand, this controls for different manu-
facturer prices. On the other hand, aggregation is less
problematic because it is likely that the change is due to a
change in the drug seller (e.g., a change from a physician to
a pharmacy). However, if the resulting aggregated obser-
vation is not completely attributable to physician nor
pharmacy dispensing, the observation is treated as physi-
cian dispensing if two-thirds of Dt is sold by a physician.
The MPD for the aggregated observation n is then given by
MPDn ¼
X
i
mif þ mivPi
 
=Dit; ð5Þ
with Dt
i = SiDi for all individual observations i belonging
to the same physician, patient, and drug.6
Drug cost per dose (CPD) is used to measure the effect
of physician dispensing on drug expenditure. The CPD
values aggregate the cost for the insurer. They are calcu-
lated as
CPDn ¼
X
i
mif þ ð1 þ mivÞPi
 
=Dit; ð6Þ
where mf
i ? (1 ? mv
i ) Pi represents the drug cost of a
single prescription i, as above.7
It is important to keep in mind that, even if there is a
positive correlation between combined drug provision and
CPD, combined drug provision may be more cost-efficient
due to savings elsewhere, e.g., generic substitution (see
Rischatsch et al. [13]). However, assessing the overall cost
efficiency of physician dispensing is not the objective of
this study. Readers interested in this topic are referred to
Trottmann [16].
There are many factors that affect the outcome vari-
ables. While some of them are under the prescriber’s
control, others are not. Inferences may be confounded if the
latter are omitted. The next subsection discusses the
covariates included in the regression analysis.
Potential margin and cost drivers
Drug margin optimization is tested in this work using a
dummy variable that indicates whether the drug was dis-
pensed by a physician (PD = 1) or a pharmacist (PD = 0).
A statistically significant and positive correlation between
PD and MPD points at margin optimization activities and
dispensing physicians acting as imperfect agents on behalf
of the payers.
As mentioned above, there are several factors affecting the
margin-per-dose and cost-per-dose values. General practi-
tioners (GPs) may face patients with different needs than
specialists. Hence, a dummy for GP is included to control for
these differences. Moreover, physicians who prescribe some
substances very rarely may be less informed about available
package sizes and dosages. Even if the investigated drugs are
blockbusters, information may affect MPD and CPD without
being correlated with margin optimization activities. Includ-
ing the number of prescriptions might be problematic because
it can be correlated with margin optimization. In contrast, the
number of patients (NPA) a physician served during the study
period is independent of the optimization effort if one assumes
that the patient number is given exogenously and that
5 The logistic drug margin is calculated neglecting value added taxes.
6 Ni cancels out of the equation because prescriptions of different
packages at the same time are treated as separate observations.
7 Again, additional fees and taxes that are either small or do not differ
between combined and separated providers are neglected.
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supplier-induced demand is absent. Furthermore, a higher
demand for a specific substance may result in a larger drug
portfolio in private-practice pharmacies. Having different
packages available permits drugs to be prescribed more cost-
efficiently.
Patients’ health insurance plans are used to control for
heterogeneity among patients. In Switzerland, citizens can
choose between different deductibles every year (see the
‘‘Institutional background’’ section). The choice of a high
deductible correlates with the patient’s expectation of a low
need for health services in the following year. Patients with,
for example, chronic diseases most likely choose the lowest
deductible. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between
these groups, because patients in need of a high total dosage
can be provided with more cost-efficient packages due to
price discounts for large packages. Hence, patient latent
health status is modeled using dummy variables for differ-
ent deductible categories. The lowest deductibles of CHF
300 or 500 serve as the reference category. Patients with a
deductible of CHF 1,000 or 1,500 are grouped into medium
deductible patients (DEDM), and those with the highest
deductibles of CHF 2,000 or 2,500 are represented by the
high deductible category (DEDH). Additionally, individu-
als opting for a health maintenance organization (HMO)
contract and physicians working in HMO practices are
expected to be more cost-aware, increasing cost efficiency.
The same might be the case for gatekeeping-insured people
(GATE). To control for demographic effects, patient age
(AGE) and gender (MALE) are included. The RUR dummy
captures differences between urban and rural practices, and
the FRIT dummy incorporates differences between French/
Italian- and German-speaking areas.
The aggregation at each patient level requires a time
indicator that allows us to control for price changes over
time, which directly affect MPD and CPD values. There-
fore, for every aggregated observation (n), the share of
prescriptions pertaining to each year is calculated, and two
share variables are included in the regression—one for
2006 (Y06) and one for 2007 (Y07), where 2005 consti-
tutes the reference category.
Rischatsch et al. [13] show that financial interests
encourage dispensing physicians to substitute brand-name
with generic drugs. In contrast to optimizing drug
choice, the present study is interested in how the com-
bination of prescription and dispensation affects package
choice when a particular drug is chosen. Therefore, drug-
specific constants (DSCs) are included to control for
different manufacturer prices across pharmaceuticals. The
brand-name drug constitutes the reference drug. Omitting
drug choice would underestimate the dispensing physi-
cians’ MPD due to a higher market share of generics
with lower logistic drug margins. Again, the present
study is interested in separating out such effects. Further,
DSCs control for additional unobserved drug-specific
effects.
The estimation equation can be written as
y ¼ b0 þ b1PD þ b2GP þ b3NPA þ b4DEDM
þ b5DEDH þ b6HMO þ b7GATE þ b8AGE
þ b9MALE þ b10RUR þ b11FRIT þ b12Y06
þ b13Y07 þ b14DSC1 þ b15DSC2 þ b16DSC3
þ b17DSC4 þ e; ð7Þ
where y [ {MPD, CPD}, and e denotes the error term.
Model specification
The estimation of MPD and CPD values using ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression can be problematic because
the data are non-negative and such data are often heavily
skewed. In this case, it is not appropriate to assume nor-
mally distributed errors, and doing so may lead to mean-
ingless negative predictions. A possible solution to this
problem is to transform the dependent variable and perform
an OLS regression on the transformed variable. The model
proposed by Box and Cox [3] can be used to find the
optimal transformation. The Box–Cox transformation of
the dependent variable leads to the estimation equation
(yk - 1)k-1 = xb ? e, where k is estimated simulta-
neously with b. In the limiting case where k is zero, the
left-hand side of the expression reduces to ln(y). The dis-
advantage of the Box–Cox model is that the b’s are not
interpretable without performing a re-transformation to the
raw scale. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, this can be
problematic and lead to biased estimates.
The generalized linear models (GLMs) approach serves
as an alternative. The great advantage of these models is
that no re-transformation to the raw scale is required after
the estimation (see Manning [8], Manning and Mullahy
[9]). A GLM is defined through its link function g() and
the distributional family of the dependent variable F(y).
The link function defines the relation between the expected
outcome E[y|x] and the linear predictor xb, so that
g(E[y|x]) = xb. The most prominent functions are the
logarithmic ln(y) = xb and the inverse y-1 = xb link
function. The optimal link function depends on the data
and can be found using the Box–Cox model discussed
previously. The distributional family F(y) defines the
relation between the mean and variance of the dependent
variable. Manning and Mullahy [9] recommend that the test
proposed by Park [11] should be used to find the optimal
mean-variance relation for the data at hand. In this study,
the gamma family in combination with the logarithmic link
function is found to fit the data best.
The GLMs in this study are estimated using the
Bayesian approach. The joint posterior K(h|D) is computed
702 M. Rischatsch
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by Bayes theorem and links the observed data (D) with the
researcher’s expectations about the unknown parameters
(h), so that
KðhjDÞ ¼ LðDjhÞ  kðhÞ
LðDÞ ; ð8Þ
where L(D|h) is the likelihood of observing D given h, k(h)
is the prior about h, and L(D) is the normalizing constant.
The denominator is independent of h and can be dropped,
resulting in K(h|D)  L(D|h) k(h), which is the product of
the likelihood times the prior distribution.
For the gamma GLM, the likelihood is given by
Cðls; sÞ, where C denotes the gamma distribution with its
scale and shape parameters. The logarithmic link function
enters the model as ln(l) = Xb, where X is the covariate
matrix. Thus, h ¼ fb; sg are the unknown parameters of
interest. Here, s is the likelihood’s precision parameter,
which is equivalent to the inverse of the variance ðs ¼
r2Þ and is assumed to have a gamma prior, i.e.,
sCðas; bsÞ. Physician-specific estimates (bp) are
obtained by specifying a hierarchical structure for the
Bayes model such that b is replaced by bp ¼ b þ dp;
where b represents the population mean effect of b and dp
represents the difference in the effect between physician
p and the population mean, with E[dp] = 0. Normal priors
are assumed at the lower hierarchical stage, so that
bNðlb; sbÞ and dp* N(0,sd), and the hyperprior for sd
at the upper level of hierarchy is assumed to be gamma
distributed with sd Cðad; bdÞ. All prior and hyperprior
parameters are chosen to make the priors as uninformative
as possible, so that their selection does not affect the
estimates. However, given the large size of the data set to
be analyzed, the weight of the assumed priors diminishes,
so their selection is not influential. The joint posterior is
then given by
Kðb; dp8p; sd; sjDÞ /
Y
p
CðDjeX bþXdp  s; sÞ
 Nðbjlb; sbÞ
 Nðdpj0; sdÞ  Cðsdjad; bdÞ
 Cðsjas; bsÞ; ð9Þ
which has no standard distribution and has to be simulated.
To reduce the complexity of the model, only the coefficient
pertaining to physician dispensing (PD) is modeled using a
hierarchical structure.
Data
To test for margin optimization, three active pharmaceu-
tical ingredients from therapeutic categories with high sales
volumes were selected: omeprazole, amlodipine, and
ciprofloxacin (see Hunkeler [7]).8 The drug claims data
were provided by a major Swiss health insurer and contain
prescription-level observations between 2005 and 2007.
Omeprazole is an inhibitor of gastric acid secretion and is
used to treat gastric and duodenal abscesses, while amlo-
dipine is a calcium channel blocker for treating angina and
ciprofloxacin is used to treat specific bacterial infections.9
A first univariate comparison of logistic drug margin per
dose between dispensing physicians and pharmacies shows
that mean and median MPD values are higher for dispensing
physicians regardless of the substance.10 For omeprazole
and amlodipine, the data reveal a negative correlation
between PD and CPD.11 This can be explained by the higher
share of generics dispensed by physicians, and underlines
the importance of including DSCs in the regression to
separate drug choice from margin optimization.
Three additional measures permit a first impression of
prescribing behavior regarding package choice. On aver-
age, dispensing physicians sold a higher number of pack-
ages to provide the median dosage per patient needed. For
omeprazole, dispensing physicians prescribed 2.3 packages
versus 1.9 packages by non-dispensing physicians. The
values for amlodipine are 3.5 versus 3.3, and for cipro-
floxacin 1.1 versus 1.0. This is in line with the average
package size prescribed. On average, omeprazole was
prescribed in packages containing 34.6 pills (dispensing
physicians) versus 42.4 pills (non-dispensing physicians).
The same tendency can be observed for amlodipine (84.5
vs. 87.6) and ciprofloxacin (12.7 vs. 14.4), which supports
the hypothesis that dispensing physicians prescribe smaller
packages.
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are
shown in Table 1. The share of sampled observations
(aggregated as discussed previously, not single prescrip-
tions) pertaining to dispensing physicians was between 39
and 52 %. Hunkeler [7] estimates a physician-dispensing
rate of 33 % for all prescriptions covered by Swiss social
health insurance. The high share emphasizes the important
role of PD in delivering pharmaceuticals in Switzerland.
GPs prescribed more than 77 % of the sampled observa-
tions. On average, physicians faced 32 patients in need of
amlodipine and ciprofloxacin, and 71 patients requiring
omeprazole. About 90 % of the sampled patients chose the
lowest deductible category, while 3–9 % signed a medium
8 ATC-codes: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01),
ciproflocaxin (J01MA02).
9 For more information, see http://www.drugbank.ca/drugs.
10 Mean MPD (in CHF per 1,000 mg) for physicians versus
pharmacies: 40.0 versus 37.6 (omeprazole), 53.1 versus 52.1 (amlo-
dipine), and 4.1 versus 3.9 (ciprofloxacin).
11 Mean CPD (in CHF per 1,000 mg) for physicians versus
pharmacies: 101.1 versus 101.7 (omeprazole), 155.8 versus 158.5
(amlodipine), and 9.0 versus 8.8 (ciprofloxacin).
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(DEDM) and 1–2 % signed a high (DEDH) deductible
contract. Only 2–4 % were HMO insured and 4–6 %
signed a gatekeeping contract. The average patient age was
58 (omeprazole), 70 (amlodipine), and 57 (ciprofloxacin).
Between 39–47 % of the sampled patients were male.
About a quarter of all practices were located in rural areas
and 33–45 % were in French- or Italian-speaking areas.
Prescriptions were distributed equally over the three years.
The DSCs display drug-specific shares of aggregated
observations where the brand-name drug is the base
category.
Estimation results
Posterior summaries for the hierarchical Bayes GLM esti-
mates are listed in Table 2. As proposed by the Box–Cox
model, logarithmic link functions are applied for all three
chemical agents, which has further advantages in that the
coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities (n), e.g.,
as the percentage change in MPD for a change from
pharmacy (PD = 0) to physician (PD = 1) dispensing,
ceteris paribus.
Margin comparison
In this study, PD is the variable to assess in order to
determine if permitting physicians to sell drugs on their
own account leads to margin optimization activities. The
posterior means for PD show that the logistic margin per
dose is 10.1 % higher for omeprazole, 5.6 % higher for
amlodipine, and 5.2 % higher for ciprofloxacin. None of
the 95 %-credibility intervals include zero, and the lowest
2.5 percentile was found for ciprofloxacin (4 %) while the
highest 97.5 percentile was found for omeprazole (11 %).
These values point to margin optimization activities by
dispensing physicians. The upper panel of Fig. 3 depicts
the Kernel densities of physician-specific semi-elasticities
(np) for physician dispensing.
The estimates pertaining to the GP variable show no
evidence for differences in the prescribing behavior
between general practitioners and specialists. While the
95 %-credibility interval includes zero in the case of
omeprazole, the interval for amlodipine is located in the
positive, while the one for ciprofloxacin lies only in the
negative domain. The same conclusions can be drawn for
the number of patients a physician faced during the study
period (NPA). Based on the credibility intervals, the effect
is positive for omeprazole and ciprofloxacin but negative
for amlodipine. The medium and high deductible catego-
ries (DEDM, DEDH) control for patients with better latent
health status who are expected to be less likely to suffer
from chronic diseases and thus have a lower likelihood of a
high drug demand. Hence, they can be supplied with less
cost-efficient packages due to the discounting of large
packages. Indeed, there is empirical evidence supporting
this expectation in the cases of omeprazole and amlodipine.
For ciprofloxacin, the mean effect is not statistically
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the covariates used
Variable Abbrev. Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Mean Med. SD Mean Med. SD Mean Med. SD
Physician dispensing PD 0.39 – – 0.45 – – 0.52 – –
General practitioner GP 0.81 – – 0.86 – – 0.77 – –
Number of patients NPA 71 30 109 32 16 47 32 15 47
Medium deductible DEDM 0.06 – – 0.03 – – 0.09 – –
High deductible DEDH 0.01 – – 0.01 – – 0.02 – –
HMO insured HMO 0.04 – – 0.02 – – 0.02 – –
Gatekeeping insured GATE 0.05 – – 0.04 – – 0.06 – –
Rural area RUR 0.25 – – 0.27 – – 0.25 – –
French/Italian FRIT 0.45 – – 0.33 – – 0.34 – –
Share prescriptions (2006) Y06 0.33 – – 0.30 – – 0.35 – –
Share of prescriptions (2007) Y07 0.41 – – 0.32 – – 0.37 – –
Patient age AGE 58 59 18 70 72 13 57 59 19
Patient sex MALE 0.39 – – 0.47 – – 0.41 – –
Share of generic drug (no. 1) DSC1 0.38 – – 0.31 – – 0.34 – –
Share of generic drug (no. 2) DSC2 0.37 – – 0.19 – – 0.27 – –
Share of generic drug (no. 3) DSC3 0.10 – – 0.09 – – 0.18 – –
Share of generic drug (no. 4) DSC4 0.07 – – 0.06 – – 0.04 – –
Mean mean values are shown, Med. median values are shown, SD standard deviations are shown
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different from zero. Heterogeneity in cost awareness
among patients is modeled by including alternative health
insurance contracts, like HMO and gatekeeping (GATE).
HMO-insured patients have 2–3 % lower MPD values.
However, omeprazole constitutes an exception where a posi-
tive correlation is found. The MPD of a gatekeeping-insured
Table 2 Hierarchical Bayes GLM results
Posterior Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Mean Percentiles Mean Percentiles Mean Percentiles
2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5
Estimation 1: Margin per dose (MPD)
Physician dispensing 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06
General practitioner 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Number of patients 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Medium deductible 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.00 -0.00 0.01
High deductible 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.03
HMO insured 0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01
Gatekeeping insured 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Patient age -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Patent sex (male) -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
Rural area -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01
French/Italian speaking 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Share of prescriptions (2006) -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10
Share of prescriptions (2007) -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13
Share of generic drug (no. 1) -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11
Share of generic drug (no. 2) -0.36 -0.37 -0.34 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
Share of generic drug (no. 3) -0.49 -0.51 -0.47 -0.19 -0.21 -0.18 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08
Share of generic drug (no. 4) -0.54 -0.56 -0.52 -0.25 -0.26 -0.23 -0.15 -0.17 -0.14
Constant 3.98 3.96 3.99 4.23 4.22 4.24 1.57 1.56 1.58
Estimation 2: Cost per dose (CPD)
Physician dispensing 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
General practitioner -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Number of patients 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Medium deductible 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01
High deductible 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.00 0.02
HMO insured 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00
Gatekeeping insured 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Rural area -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.01
French/Italian speaking 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
Share of prescriptions (2006) -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.34 -0.34 -0.33 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21
Share of prescriptions (2007) -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.52 -0.52 -0.51 -0.27 -0.27 -0.26
Patient age -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Patient sex (male) -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06
Share of generic drug (no. 1) -0.73 -0.74 -0.73 -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.28 -0.28 -0.27
Share of generic drug (no. 2) -0.78 -0.79 -0.78 -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19
Share of generic drug (no. 3) -0.97 -0.98 -0.96 -0.44 -0.45 -0.43 -0.20 -0.21 -0.19
Share of generic drug (no. 4) -0.86 -0.87 -0.85 -0.53 -0.54 -0.52 -0.31 -0.33 -0.30
Constant 5.35 5.34 5.36 5.52 5.51 5.52 2.55 2.55 2.56
Number of observations 72,488 40,749 66,236
Number of physicians 7,314 5,919 7,675
Model specification: Gamma GLM family (F) with logarithmic link function (g). To facilitate simulation, the two explanatory variables number
of patients (NPA) and patient age (AGE) were standardized to have E[x] = 0, Var[x] = 1
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patient is not statistically different from that of a basically
insured patient, which is also true for differences between
rural and urban practices (RUR). For omeprazole and amlo-
dipine, the MPD is higher for practices located in French- and
Italian-speaking areas (FRIT) compared to German-speaking
regions. However, ciprofloxacin contradicts this finding, so no
clear statement can be made without performing further
analysis of additional substances. Having a higher share of
prescriptions in 2006 (Y06) and 2007 (Y07) decreases the
MPD, as expected, due to price reductions over time. Further,
elderly patients receive packages with a lower MPD, which
can be explained analogously to the deductible categories.
Elderly patients may receive the drugs because of chronic
diseases or simply having by a higher drug demand, so they
can be supplied with larger cost-efficient packages. Surpris-
ingly, MPDs for males are significantly lower. The drug-
specific constants (DSCs) have expected signs and magni-
tudes considering the lower manufacturer prices of generic
drugs.
Drug cost comparison
Regarding the effect of combining drug prescription and
dispensation on pharmaceutical expenditure, the outcome
variable of interest is the cost per dose (CPD) prescribed.
Again, cost is defined to be equal to the sales price in this
study. Other costs, such as pharmacy fees, are neglected
here. If one is interested in assessing the overall cost effi-
ciency of combined drug delivery, other potential sources
for cost savings should be considered, e.g., generic sub-
stitution. The estimated semi-elasticities (see the lower
panel of Table 2) signify that physician dispensing
increases pharmaceutical expenditure due to inefficient
package choice.
The estimated posterior means of n’s for PD with
respect to CPD are 4.6 % (omeprazole), 3.4 %
(amlodipine), and 2.6 % (ciproflocaxin). Again, none of the
95 %-credibility intervals include zero, and the lowest 2.5
percentile is found for ciprofloxacin (2.0 %), while the
highest 97.5 percentile is estimated for omeprazole
(5.4 %). These estimates show that physician dispensing
leads to a higher drug cost if only package choice is con-
sidered. However, generic substitution and other potential
savings (see the discussion above) could overcompensate
for these costs. In addition, even in the case of a higher
pharmaceutical cost, patients’ willingness to pay for easier
access to pharmaceuticals may be higher than the addi-
tional cost, thus legitimizing physician dispensing. In
Switzerland, a referendum in 2009 revealed that citizens
are strongly in favor of dispensing physicians.
Conclusions and discussion
While most countries separate drug prescription and dis-
pensation to ensure independent drug choice, some coun-
tries grant the authority to physicians to dispense or
pharmacists to prescribe drugs on their own account. On
the one hand, this approach facilitates access to pharma-
ceuticals in rural areas and makes greater use of pharma-
cists’ skills. On the other hand, a drawback of combining
drug prescription and dispensation is the potential for drug
margin optimization by combined drug providers, which
may lead to higher pharmaceutical expenditure due to
inappropriate prescription of drug packages.
This study sought to answer two questions. First, what
role does the pharmaceutical pricing mechanism play in
setting financial incentives for dispensing physicians to
conduct margin optimization? Second, is there empirical
evidence for margin optimization by dispensing physicians
in Switzerland? The theoretical part of the study showed
that the per-package margin component incentivizes dis-
pensing physicians to reduce package size in return for a
higher quantity of packages. The findings from hierarchical
Bayes GLM estimation support the expected positive cor-
relation between physician dispensing and logistic drug
margin per dose (MPD) as well as the pharmaceutical cost
per dose (CPD). For MPD, the posterior means of the semi-
elasticities with respect to the physician-dispensing dummy
indicate that the margins are 5–10 % higher for dispensing
physicians compared to the margins of pharmacists. None
of the 95 %-credibility intervals include zero. The CPD is
3–5 % higher for dispensing physicians, indicating that
profit considerations lead to higher drug expenditure due to
inappropriate package choice. However, physician dis-
pensing could lower pharmaceutical bills through other
cost savings. Thus, the study does not allow us to put
forward a general statement about the cost efficiency of
combined drug provision. However, the evidence that
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Fig. 3 Dispersion of physician-specific PD effects (np)
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dispensing physicians receive higher logistic margins than
pharmacists indicates that dispensing physicians are
imperfect agents for their patients. Further, the analysis
shows that margin optimization most likely arises because
of the per-package margin component used in the drug
pricing mechanism. Hence, some regulatory changes could
help to mitigate inadequate package choice by dispensing
physicians. First, the per-package margin should be abol-
ished. Second, package prices should relate linearly to the
dosage contained. These two changes would remove all
incentives originating from the logistic margin, because—
regardless of how the drug is dispensed—the same drug
quantity would always lead to the same logistic drug
margin. However, a drawback of the latter is that it makes
large packages more expensive than they currently are,
because discounts would cease to exist. However,
discounting could be retained, because its effect is negli-
gible compared to the effect of the per-package margin.
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Appendix
See Tables 3, 4 and 5.
Table 3 Logistic drug margin regulation
Abbrev. Unit Price category
Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 3 Cat. 4 Cat. 5 Cat. 6
Manufacturer price P CHF \5.00 5.00–10.99 11.00–14.99 15.00–799.99 800–1,799 C1,800
Per-package component mf CHF 4.00 8.00 12.00 16.00 60.00 240.00
Capital component mv % 12–15 12–15 12–15 12–15 8–10 –
Source: Drabinski et al. [4] (1 CHF & 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates)
Table 4 Manufacturer price relation for packages of the same drug
Discount rate Formula Number of pills (S) Dosage per pill (D)
S* 2S* 3S* 4S* 5S* D* 2D* 3D* 4D*
– 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 – 0.18 0.24 0.30
Linear price P ¼ l  P l = 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Discounted price P ¼ d  P d = 1.00 1.76 2.55 3.28 3.95 1.00 1.64 2.28 2.80
P* denotes the reference price of a drug. It is the price of the smallest available package with respect to the number of pills and the dosage per
pill, and constitutes the starting point for the pricing of other packages of the same drug. Using the discount rates (d), the discounted manufacture
prices are given by P ¼ d  P. Comparing the applied discounted with the hypothetical linear manufacturer prices shows that, for example, a
package with 100 pills (5S*) costs only 3.95 instead of 5.00 times the price of a package with 20 pills (S*). Source: BAG [1]
Table 5 Example of relative changes in logistic drug margins (Dt = 560, D = 20)
Number of... Antra MUPS Omezol-Mepha MT Omed Oprazol Omeprazole Helvepharm
Pills Packages Margin D Margin D Margin D Margin D Margin D
28 1 32.82 1.00 22.52 1.00 22.47 1.00 25.20 1.00 21.35 1.00
14 2 49.92 1.52 38.10 1.69 38.01 1.69 41.10 1.63 29.10 1.36
7 4 84.96 2.59 57.00 2.53 N.A. – N.A. – 39.00 1.83
Logistic drug margins are shown in CHF (1 CHF & 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates). Relative changes are denoted by D. Once the
manufacturer prices for all available packages of a drug are defined, the logistic drug margin for each package is determined depending on the
manufacturer price category, as discussed in the ‘‘Institutional background’’ section. The logistic drug margins shown above are those of the
brand-name drug of omeprazole (see the illustrative example in the ‘‘Institutional background’’ section) and four of its generic competitors
N.A. not available
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